The Ethics versus Aesthetics Criticism in Architecture

Introduction

The practice of architectural criticism is supercharged with ethical evaluations. We praise certain works of architecture for their sustainability, their inspiring and enlivening character, their encouragement of an autonomous and satisfying life for their users, or their contribution to the peaceful cohabitation of different social or ethnic groups. We criticize other works for the harm they cause to the environment, for their negative impact on the health or well-being of human beings, for the morally reprehensible attitudes they convey or the morally despicable functions they serve. Such assessments of architectural works are of an ethical nature, or at least possess an ethical dimension. The main objective that I wish to address in this essay is the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in architecture. The answer I defend is the ethical value of an architectural work has a bearing on its architectural value, and that the ethical and aesthetic value of such a work has a bearing on each other. More precisely: A work of architecture will in some cases be aesthetically flawed (or meritorious) due to the fact that it has ethical flaws (or merits).

Supportive Arguments

1. The role of functional considerations in architectural criticism which linked to ethic values

The shapes and forms must be arranged such as to provide a suitable framework for specific human activities. Functional considerations have a bearing on the ethical evaluation as functional suitability of an architectural work can influence the well being of its users. For example, a building is praised ethically for spatial adequacy and user-friendliness. However, functional considerations frequently influence also the aesthetic evaluation of an architectural work. A building can be functionally beautiful if the appearance is satisfied and fit for its function.

Art Nouveau residential buildings appear to offer a place suitable for living. A building can also be functionally beautiful if it exhibits a pleasing tension with respect to its function, given that it full-fill its purpose yet shows some surprising features in relation to its functional category.

2. The link between beautiful and good was reinforced by the quasi identity of a set of transcendental concepts

According to Ruskin, deception is inherently sinful. An architect who intentionally hides structural supports in order to suggest that a building stands by itself when this is not really the case, or who introduces pseudo-supports that do not play their apparent role, deceives honest people and, because of this deception, discredits his profession.

For example, in support of Ruskin’s ethical views on the structural truth of gothic construction, he observes that, “the beauty of its traceries would be enhanced to him [an intelligent observer of a gothic structure] if they confessed and followed the lines of its main strength.”

3. Aesthetic values could not be dissociated from ethical ones because architecture was transforming the world in which their society was evolving

Most champions of the ethical role of architecture were inclined to define the architect’s duty as the obligation to express through their buildings the spirit of the period in which they live. Eugène Viollet-leDuc, though as fascinated as Ruskin by the virtues of Gothic architecture, was convinced that architects should contribute to the development of a rational architecture appropriate to their own time.

In 1908, Adolf Loos harshly condemned the lavishly adorned architecture of Vienna by claiming that a backward-looking complacency in ornamentation is “a crime against the national economy” resulting “in a waste of human labor, money, and material.”The emphasis on the economic aspect of this moral crime illustrates fairly well how even an aesthetically elitist architect such as Loos was fully conscious that architects were engaged in the socioeconomic enterprise of rebuilding a better world for an increasing population.

4. The improvement of social behavior through efficient architecture as the triumph of ethics inseparable from aesthetics

According to Bruno Taut, if everything is founded on sound efficiency, this efficiency will form its own aesthetic law. A building must be beautiful when seen from outside if it reflects all these qualities [. . .] The architect who achieves this task becomes a creator of an ethical and social character; the people who use the building for any purpose, will, through the structure of the house, be brought to a better behavior in their mutual dealings and relationship with each other.

Thus architecture becomes the creator of new social observances. This modernist view states that if architects do indeed have such an important role to play in society’s improvement, they must avoid being guilty of the sins of their predecessors. Not only must they strive to bring about a better built world, free from the encumbering and useless elements that handicapped the architecture of the past, but, as educators of the society emerging with this new architecture, they must also strive to make the latter perfectly transparent.

Opposing Arguments

1. Irrelevant dimensions objection

Not every ethical flaw of an architectural work is aesthetically relevant: A building construction of which human rights of workers have been violated, or a building which uses materials produced under inhuman conditions, may be ethically flawed, but it is doubtful whether such a building is consequently aesthetically flawed. This raises the question whether there are general conditions of aesthetic relevance with regard to architecture. It seems unlikely that there exist strict criteria, but we might hope to find symptoms of the aesthetic relevance of ethical flaws or merits. As a rough idea, an ethical flaw or merit tends to be aesthetically relevant if it is essentially connected to at least one main feature of architectural works; frequently mentioned candidates for such features are (a building’s) form, function, structure, and meaning. An ethical flaw is essentially connected to such a feature if the feature could not have been realized or maintained in morally legitimate ways, or if the flaw consists of ethically problematic aspects or effects of this feature. A general account of aesthetic relevance is certainly desirable, yet not necessary to argue successfully this statement.

2. Aesthetic attitude objection

It claims that ethical flaws or merits of an architectural work are never aesthetically relevant because we adopt an aesthetic attitude when we assess works aesthetically, and this attitude is insensitive to moral considerations. The aesthetic attitude is generally characterized in term of disinterested attention to the aesthetic object. It has been questioned whether such a specific aesthetic attitude exists, but even if it According to Bruno Taut, if everything is founded on sound efficiency, this efficiency will form its own aesthetic law. A building must be beautiful when seen from outside if it reflects all these qualities [. . .] The architect who achieves this task becomes a creator of an ethical and social character; the people who use the building for any purpose, will, through the structure of the house, be brought to a better behavior in their mutual dealings and relationship with each other. does, a dilemma arises. Either the aesthetic attitude is understood as precluding any appeal to functional considerations, or it is understood in some other way. In Jerome Stolnitz’s approach, for instance, disinterestedness requires a deliberate withholding of concepts so that the very attempt to conceptualize an object in terms of its function is incompatible with adopting an aesthetic attitude.

3. Immoral function objection

It claims that ethical flaws of works are sometimes aesthetic merits at the same time. As we have seen, an architectural work may be aesthetically meritorious when it is functionally beautiful. However, an architectural work can be functionally beautiful with respect to an immoral function. In such a case, the work is aesthetically meritorious due to the fact that it is ethically flawed. Thus, the ethical flaws of architectural works may be in some cases aesthetic merits.

An argument along these lines has been put forward by Andrea Sauchelli. His example is the Basilica of Saint Peter in Rome. A critic of Catholicism might argue that it has the immoral function of promoting an ideological worldview that harmfully influences moral education. However, the critic might, at the same time, appreciate the ingenuity and adequacy of the Basilica’s design to the end of fulfilling this immoral function.

The critic might argue that the Basilica is functionally beautiful with respect to an immoral function, thus illustrating a building’s ethical flaw that at the same time is an aesthetic merit. In such cases, though, it is not the ethical flaw as such that promotes the aesthetic merit. The aesthetic merit is based on the function, not on the immorality. Hence the example does not establish any particular connection between aesthetic value and immorality.

4. Inseparability objection

According to moderate moralism, some moral flaws are aesthetic flaws, so it seems that the removal of such moral flaws should lead to aesthetic improvement of the work – but this is not the case. An aesthetically commendable feature of an architectural work (e.g., its functional beauty) may depend on its moral flaws (i.e., having an immoral function). Hence removing the moral flaw (replacing the immoral function by a morally good one) would not necessarily aesthetically improve the work, since it might then no longer be functionally beautiful. However, as Gaut stresses, moderate moralism does not claim that removal of a moral flaw invariably leads to an aesthetically better work. Moderate moralism is formulated in terms of the pro tanto principle, which ethical flaws of a work diminish its aesthetic value. But moderate moralism does not hold that removing an ethical flaw must – all things considered – An argument along these lines has been put forward by Andrea Sauchelli. His example is the Basilica of Saint Peter in Rome. A critic of Catholicism might argue that it has the immoral function of promoting an ideological worldview that harmfully influences moral education. However, the critic might, at the same time, appreciate the ingenuity and adequacy of the Basilica’s design to the end of fulfilling this immoral function. aesthetically improve the work. The reason is that removing the ethical flaw (namely, replacing the immoral function) might remove some other aesthetic merit depending on that flaw (namely, its functional beauty). Thus, moderate moralism agrees with contextualism that removing a moral flaw might not aesthetically improve an architectural work, all things considered, but moderate moralism insists that, when a work is ethically flawed, it is aesthetically flawed, too.

Deliberations and conclusion

I have proposed two main factors to consider when evaluating a work of architecture, which is more concern in the relationship between the ethical and the aesthetic value out of the values involved in composing the architectural value. The arguments claim that the ethical and the aesthetic value interact in such a manner that an architectural work will in some cases be aesthetically flawed (or meritorious) due to the fact that it is ethically flawed (or meritorious) and vice versa.